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Abstract 
With the assumption of Jair Bolsonaro to the Presidency of Brazil the new president is looking to overhaul key com-
ponents of the economy.  Influenced by conservative thinker Olavo de Carvalho and supported by a team of like-minded 
free-market aficionados such as Paulo Guedes and Paulo Uebel, President Bolsonaro has issued an executive medida 
provisória to stimulate business development in Brazil by eliminating costs and bureaucracy for Brazilian businesses.  
The Medida Provisória 881 is already being considered a hallmark of legislation that is quintessential for the economy 
and the nation.  This historic bill is often referred to as an “economic bill of rights”. 
 
1. Why a “Medida Provisória”?1 
The Brazilian medidas provisórias are not exactly the 
equivalent of American executive orders. There is one simi-
larity though: with a strike of the president’s pen, they be-
come somewhat a “law of the land.” In the Brazilian case, 
they must be voted on by congress after 120 days, other-
wise, the law is struck down. However, until the end of the 
law ́s process in congress, the law is considered in full 
effect once initiated.  
That is why Bolsonaro’s administration chose to intro-
duce those measures as a medida provisória so that small 
businesses and entrepreneurs could readily benefit from 
the new rules.  The Bolsonaro administration expects that 
MP 881 may result in the creation of 3.7 million more 
jobs.2 As of September 20, 2019, MP 881 became Federal 
Law Number 13.874/2019. When the current article was 
being written, MP 881 was not law yet; therefore, the cur-
rent Law 13.874/2019 is referred to as MP 881.   
2. Introduction 
The new Brazilian "Economic Liberty Law” promises to 
assist startups and those businesses that are free-market 
minded by slashing away at needless restrictions.   
For a few years in the 1990s, it appeared that Brazil 
might escape a tumultuous cyclical economic fate through 
cardinal reforms implemented by President Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso.3 President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ́s first 
presidential term maintained Cardoso’s fiscal anchors par-
tially intact, expenditures on rentiers was replaced by ex-
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penditures on public investment.4 Enjoying the commodity 
boom, Lula's administration boosted social programs and 
expanded foreign spending throughout aligned Latin 
American countries.   
However, PT’s (The Brazilian Worker´s Party) hopes of 
staying in power were disillusioned due to a series of co-
nundrums as a profound economic crisis engulfed Brazil.  
Staggering violence, crumbling infrastructure, controver-
sial education programs, and corruption scandals enlight-
ened by the ongoing Operation Car Wash, which is a feder-
al police investigation involving the state-owned company 
Petrobras, all contributed to a recession that occurred in 
2016 in Brazil.  All these issues led to Dilma’s impeachment 
that same year for budgetary misconduct. 
Many Brazilian conservatives and libertarians are wary 
of President Jair Bolsonaro, a nationalistic military man 
unschooled in economics.5 They fear he might return to 
populist, government-centric economic policies of the dic-
tatorship years.6 Bolsonaro’s voting record did not assuage 
conservatives and libertarians either..  Jair Bolsonaro was a 
niche congressman, who focused for 30 years on the needs 
of the military and police. To allay fears that he was ill-
prepared to deal with the Brazilian economy he surrounded 
himself with a team of economic free-market advocates.    
3. The Economic Mastermind 
Jair Bolsonaro added Paulo Guedes, an investment 
banker, to be his minister of economy.  Bolsonaro ́s economic 
minister is a Chicago trained free-market enthusiast who co-
founded the investment bank BTG Pactual.  Bolsonaro met 
Guedes through Beatriz Kicis and Winston Ling.  Winston 
Ling is a Brazilian-Chinese entrepreneur. Beatriz Kicis 
(“Bia Kicis”) is a former Federal District attorney and cur-
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rent federal deputy in Brasília. Bia and Winston arranged a 
meeting between Guedes and Bolsonaro in 2017. 
Winston Ling is the founder of the Institute for Entre-
preneurship Studies (IEE in Portuguese) in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil. IEE was the only free-market forum in Brazil for 
decades.  Since the 1980s its annual conference known as 
“Fórum da Liberdade” (Liberty Forum) has been taking 
place. Brazil's recent right-wing economic movement was 
shaped at the annual “Fórum da Liberdade” and all subse-
quent conservative economic thought was guided by IEE 
gatherings, including the Millenium Institute. 
Mr. Guedes is a fervent proponent of the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Salim Mattar, a successful busi-
nessman and now Guedes’ Secretary for Privatization, 
weighs in on Bolsonaro’s shift of conviction after two years 
of talks with Mr. Guedes.7  Mattar observes that Bolsonaro 
went from a free market skeptical into a forceful small gov-
ernment advocate, at least given Brazilian standards.8 Dur-
ing the campaign trail, Bolsonaro jocosely mentioned 
Guedes as his “Posto Ipiranga” (Ipiranga gas station is a 
common gas station in Brazil), a business depicted as all-
knowing and all-solving. 
Paulo Guedes’ economic team reflects his modus op-
erandi of “free market-shock.” It is on record that the gov-
ernment is hoping to privatize around 130-180 state-owned 
companies by the end of Bolsonaro’s mandate.9 According 
to Guedes in addition to selling government properties, the 
total revenue generated can reach BRL 1,25 trillion..10 It 
seems that the initial USD 20 billion in estimated assets 
sold will be easily surpassed.11 Now there are new state 
companies in play. The government announced a list of 17 
state companies, all of which will be completely privatized, 
these privatizations include Eletrobrás, Telebrás, Serpro, 
Dataprev, Casa da Moeda, and Correios, which is the Bra-
zilian equivalent of the United States Postal Service. 
4. Guedes’ Economic Team 
Paulo Antônio Spencer Uebel a resolute libertarian and 
an avid follower of objectivism, as espoused in Ayn Rand’s 
classic Atlas Shrugged, was recently named Secretary of 
Government Management and E-government in the Bolso-
naro administration.  He is the chief architect of Medida 
Provisiória 881. Mr. Uebel holds an MPA from Columbia 
University, possesses CEO experience and was the Munici-
pal Secretary of Public Management for the city of São Pau-
lo under João Dória’s administration.12 Paulo Uebel is 
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charged with implementing Paulo Guedes ́s programs on 
government efficiency.  During his time working with the 
governor of São Paulo, João Doria, Mr. Uebel executed 
several conservative economic reforms: cutting govern-
ment spending drastically, renegotiating contracts, and 
controlling civil servants productivity.  Uebel was also re-
sponsible for the implementation of E-governance in the 
city government of São Paulo. He was behind the idea of 
closing the paper version of the Official Gazette of São Pau-
lo. With his experience and energy Mr. Uebel is bringing 
his strategy from the local level to the federal level, the 
engine for this strategy implementation is Medida Provisó-
ria 881 (MP 881). Uebel's imprint in medida provisória MP 
881 consists of several factors: reducing the executive's 
fiscal impact on economic activity, drastically reducing 
start-up and pre-start-up costs, speeding up the process of 
digitizing public administration documents, and streamlin-
ing regulatory impact of public administration.  Mr. 
Uebel ́s aspiration has been to make economic activity 
more flexible. 
Paulo Uebel was responsible for several municipal exec-
utive decrees and the revocation of over 200 city level ex-
ecutive orders. His idea was to reduce from 1600 municipal 
decrees to 30 in the city government of São Paulo. At the 
federal level, he is the author of a massive number of revo-
cations of ministerial orders revocation, by the hundreds, 
known as revogaço. 
Mattar laid out his strategy of free market expansion, 
which portends that “you have to learn to crawl before you 
learn to walk.”13  Matter has championed the privatization 
of subsidiaries as means of introducing the concept of pri-
vatization. Up to this point, a multitude of subsidiaries, 
such as Petrobras Pasadena refinery, targeted by the Car 
Wash operation, was sold to the Chevron group for half its 
price, and has since been privatized. Other examples of 
recent subsidiary privatizations are Petrobras subsidiaries 
in Paraguay and TAG.14  There are also ongoing negotia-
tions regarding Liquigás and Br Tur, a Banco do Brasil 
subsidiary.  This relaxed approach to privatization is a 
smooth transition for the country as the Bolsonaro admin-
istration strives to move Brazil's economic ethos from state 
control to private initiative. 
Marcos Troyjo, a former Brazilian diplomat, oversees 
Foreign Trade & International Affairs in the ministry of the 
economy.  Despite being an important economy, Brazil 
does not represent an influential player in international 
trade. The Bolsonaro administration realizes that Brazil is 
not living up to its trade potential. Brazil’s is an unusually 
closed economy as measured by trade penetration, with 
exports plus imports equal to just 27.6 percent of GDP in 
2013.15 Brazil’s large size is often used to explain its relative 
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lack of openness. But this argument does not stand up to 
scrutiny: among the six countries with larger economies 
than Brazil’s, the average trade-to-GDP ratio is 55 per 
cent.16 Given the size of its economy, we would expect Bra-
zil’s trade to be equal to 85 percent of GDP, three times its 
actual size. Controlling for other dimensions of country size 
(surface area and population) and structural features often 
associated with trade openness (urbanization, manufactur-
ing share in GDP) still cannot adequately explain Brazil’s 
lack of openness.17 Bearing that in mind, Guedes envi-
sioned a shift from an import substitution industrialization 
model to a free-trade modus operandi similar to what oc-
curred in Chile.  
Troyjo was the chosen name for the role of Foreign 
Trade and International Affairs at the ministry of economy, 
since he is a long-term expert regarding trade agreements. 
He currently is the lead Brazilian negotiator in Mercosur-
European Union Agreement establishment. Moreover, he is 
heading the talks for bilateral free-trade agreements, such 
as the one with Mexico. Troyjo is known for being a 
straight-shooter negotiator and stark partisan of enhancing 
international economic ties.  Troyjo and some members of 
Bolsonaro´s economic team were affiliated with the Mil-
lennium Institute. 
The Millennium Institute (Imil) is a Rio de Janeiro 
based laissez-faire think tank founded by Universidade do 
Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) Professor Denis Rosenfeld and 
the economist Patrícia Carlos de Andrade in 2006. They 
founded the institution as a bulwark against left-wing in-
spired economic principles, which were prevalent at the 
time in Latin America. 
Since then, Imil has drawn various thinkers and right-
wing factions, from conservative leaning to centrist neolib-
eral policy supporters. Imil has beckoned well-known intel-
lectuals such as Gustavo Franco, Armínio Fraga, Pedro 
Bial, Ives Gandra, Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter. Its sponsors 
and partners include mass media corporations, such as 
Globo Organization, Folha, Abril and RBS groups. Finan-
cial institutions such as Bank of America and BMG-Pactual, 
are also related to the organization.  
The institute gained momentum during the end of Lu-
la’s administration, as a fountain of capitalist thought in 
socialist inspired times. As time went on and PT consoli-
dated its reign in Brazilian politics, Imil seemed to become 
more influential and more deep-rooted in libertarianism, 
by including names such as Paulo Guedes, Sallim Mattar, 
Paulo Uebel, and Marcos Troyjo. These individuals wrote 
articles, held panels, gave interviews, and tried to influence 
policies by disseminating liberal economic liberal ideas. 
Hence, the Bolsonaro economic team was forged at the 
Millennium Institute. However, the Institute did not foster 
the Bolsonaro candidacy necessarily.  Many prominent 
financial establishment figures from the Institute were 
aligned with centrist politicians leading up to the 2018 
election such as Geraldo Alckmin or João Amoêdo and 
were not staunch supporters of Bolsonaro.  Regardless if 
                                                             
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
any centrist or center-right candidate were to have won the 
2018 election it is probable that key individuals from the 
Institute would be in the government somehow.   
Public Management in Brazil is undergoing an “Ameri-
canization” process.  This is deep-rooted in the nomination 
of Paulo Guedes as the Minister of Economy and his under-
secretaries Paulo Uebel, Marcos Troyjo and Salim Mattar. 
The Medida Provisória 881 written and designed by Paulo 
Uebel and the rest of the economic team under Paulo 
Guedes has championed a Brazilian “Economic Bill of 
Rights” through an American lens.   
5. Challenges to Business Development 
Understanding the mind-sets of the architects of MP 
881, it is now clear to comprehend MP 881 itself, which is 
the legal instrument for the new public and private man-
agement culture in Brazilian economic activities.  This 
measure has gained considerable support from the public 
and is already considered a landmark in the annals of Bra-
zilian laws.   
Everyone in Brazil agrees that the Brazilian State is ex-
tremely burdensome, totally ineffective, remarkably bu-
reaucratic and unnecessarily complicated. The aim of Me-
dida Provisória 881 is to eliminate this government red 
tape.  Hence, every action towards easing bureaucracy in 
small businesses’ practices, reducing costs and governmen-
tal fees, simplifying regulatory, and legal businesses’ re-
quirements, rigidly controlling arbitrary businesses’ over-
sight, fast-tracking government activities, and ending paper 
document demand will resonate positively with the public.  
Authorizations and permits alone represent costs 
around BRL 80 billion to small companies every year in 
Brazil.18 In Canada, for example, costs related to business-
es’ opening and pre-opening administrative and bureau-
cratic expenses are significantly cheaper.19  
Worldwide, small companies devote an average of 120 
days to administrative tasks. In Brazil, these numbers are 
considerably higher than normal.20  The amount of time 
spent working per worker in Brazil is among the top three 
in the world.21 Another barrier to businesses' improvement 
in Brazil is also time-related. The country is among the 
worst in terms of business’ opening.  It usually takes 100 
days to open a company in Brazil.22 Another peculiarity in 
Brazil is that companies assign almost 2000 hours to ac-
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counting matters a year.23 Overall, businesses throughout 
the country spend BRL 60 billion every year solely calculat-
ing and paying taxes.24 Those numbers are some of the 
worst comparatively to other countries regarding tax bu-
reaucracy.  These negative business opening and operating 
expenses leads Brazil to the bottom of every think tank’s 
Economic Freedom Index. The Brazilian State now recog-
nizes the almost complete lack of economic freedom that 
pervades it, a recognition that would be unfathomable 
years ago.25 Brazil is in the 109th position in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business Index, 150th in Heritage Founda-
tion’s Economic Liberty Index, 144th in Fraser Institute's 
economic freedom index and 123th in Cato ́s economic 
freedom Institute ranks.26  
These negative statistics are well-known and even rec-
ognized by the Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista). 
Fundação Perseu Abramo, which is a think-tank connected 
to the party, promoted research on low-income neighbor-
hoods in São Paulo. The results demonstrated a stark pres-
ence of free-market oriented, competitiveness enhance-
ment, government efficiency and individualism ideals.27 It 
is a new working class, whose roots are intertwined with 
neo-evangelical stances.28 As a result, São Paulo periferias, 
which traditionally sided with PT, since 2012 had a shift to 
conservative leaning candidates.29  
6. The Legislation: Medida Provisória 881 
Article One’s highlights  
Article I establish economic freedom rights, instituting 
standards of protection for free enterprise and free exercise 
of economic activity and ensures that the state evaluates its 
regulatory agencies.  
Paragraph I. The provisions of this law shall be ob-
served in the application and interpretation of civil law, 
business, economic, urban and work in legal relations with-
in its scope of enforcement and public order, including the 
exercise of professions, commerce, public records, transit, 
transport and protection of the environment. 
Paragraph II. Interprets economic freedom and good 
faith and with respect to contracts, investments and prop-
erties of all norms of public ordination about private eco-
nomic activities. 
Paragraph VI.  Ensures the liberation of economic activ-
ities so that individuals or small businesses may commence 
economic activities.   













Commentary on Article One 
The law starts with a Declaration of the Rights of Eco-
nomic Freedom, which establish protective norms on free 
enterprise and the free exercise of economic activities. Arti-
cle one also mentions standards on government actions as 
a regulatory agent.  
The Brazilian Constitution already guarantees economic 
freedom, but there was not a single clear piece of legislation 
specifying the general constitutional provisions.  
Article 170 of the Brazilian Constitution refers to “pri-
vate property” and “free competition” as principles of the 
Brazilian economic order.  Whereas article 174 determines 
government economic planning as a determinant to the 
public sector and only indicative of the private sector. 
There has been plenty of discussions on what “indicative” 
would mean in that context. Theoretically, regulatory pub-
lic administrative bodies’ economic planning should only 
apply to government projects, in practice, to the private 
sector they provide suggestive guidance.   
Article 1, paragraph I, establishes the limits regarding MP 
881 ́s legal provisions. MP 881’s disposition must be observed 
on the application and interpretation of private, business, ur-
ban and labor law. The law also extends the same provision 
to notarial and public registration, commerce, trade 
boards, transportation, city traffic, professional associa-
tions and environmental protection. The third paragraph of 
Article 1 states that financial and tax law are not included 
in MP 881. 
The applicable consumer protection cause in article one 
was eliminated by the Chamber of Deputies even though 
consumer protection is prevalent in most other economic 
related laws. 
Every public norm on economic activities has to be in-
terpreted in favor of economic freedom, good-faith and 
respect to contracts, investments and private property. 
Paragraph II establishes an interpretation that is friend-
lier to legal interpretation.  By establishing some sort of 
deference to free market and private property strengthen-
ing values, public rules’ interpretation cannot subvert the 
core principles of economic freedom.  
Finally, paragraph VI is a fundamental provision, since 
it defines atos públicos de liberação.  These are acts where 
the government approves of actions undertaken. They 
could be literally translated as “public acts of liberation.” 
What the lawmakers intended was that any broad kind of 
public authorization regarding economic activities, whether 
it be a permit, license, approval, consent form or any other 
type, would be within MP 881’s reach. The legislation also 
includes any part thereof or any stage within public acts of 
liberation processing. It was made generically on purpose, 
so that no government liberation act would be regulated or 
directed under different standards.  
Article Two’s highlights 
Article 2. The following principles guide what is written 
in this law: Clause I - freedom as a guarantee in the exer-
cise of economic activity; Clause II - good faith from indi-
viduals before public authority;  Clause III - subsidiary and 
government intervention in the exercise of entrepreneurial 
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economic activities; and Clause IV - recognition of individ-
uals’ vulnerability before the government. 
Commentary on Article Two 
Through the reader's perspective, clause I could be un-
derstood as a guarantee per se, not as a principle. Govern-
ment must assure by law that entrepreneurship is free from 
unwarranted limitations.  
The same principle applies to clause II, which could be 
interpreted as a general clause or a legal presumption. To 
properly register a company in Brazil, the variety of docu-
ments required is overwhelming.  Documents such as char-
tered or notarial authentication, and signature recognition 
are just some of the documents currently needed to open a 
business.  The many documents needed to open a business 
reflects that bureaucracy has always been a mainstay in the 
Brazilian conscious. This tendency of bureaucracy hails 
from colonial times when a court system was established to 
regulate merchants’ and businesses’ transactions, such as 
registration, enrolments, official translators and trustee 
appointments as well as many others.30  Historians and 
sociologists such as Sergio Buarque de Holanda have theo-
rized that it derives from practices established by Portugal 
during the colonization of Brazil.   
There is a bad-faith presumption regarding Brazilian 
citizens. The underlying notion is that people act in an im-
moral fashion par excellence, until its proven otherwise. In 
this sense, public offices demand chartered authentication, 
signature recognition, paper documents as a means of 
good-faith proof. Every slight minor formal inaccuracy can 
nullify an entire administrative procedure. This is detri-
mental in the realm of economic freedom.  By penalizing 
the ones that commit fraud or dangerous acts, the Brazilian 
government is just now starting from the assumption that 
most Brazilians consists of law-abiding citizens. Not every-
one should disburse pricey and pointless documents and 
wait for indefinite time; there should only be extra re-
quirements for those who are acting in a suspicious man-
ner. As French politician and writer Alain Peyrefitte ́s pro-
fesses, for a community to consistently progress, its individuals 
must trust in each other. Same applies to government practices: a 
public administrator that wants to interfere in every sphere of 
human economic activity can spoil the natural flow of wealth 
generation.  
Clause III represents a shift of Brazilian executive busi-
ness intent. Traditionally, since the Vargas administration, 
there has been a multitude of state-owned companies. At 
that time, the general argument behind the government's 
interference in the economic sphere was the lack of invest-
ment from private investors. Thus, the federal government 
stepped-in and created a series of public enterprises, such 
as Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional CSN, Vale do Rio Doce 
and Petrobras. The military dictatorship that transpired in 
1964 and the administrations of Inacio Lula Da Silva and 
Dilma Rouessef substantially increased the number of pub-
lic companies. In 2018, local, state, and federal govern-
ments held 418 state companies in total. 
                                                             
30 http://mapa.an.gov.br/index.php/menu-de-categorias-2/348-
tribunais-do-comercio 
The outcome expected out of Clause III is setting ultima 
ratio standards concerning government action in the eco-
nomic sphere. That means the government should only 
interfere as an option of last resort.   
As expected, clause IV could be comprehended as a 
simple acknowledgment or even a legal presumption. 
Clause IV sets state recognition of individuals’ weak posi-
tion when confrontation with government interests. This 
matter can be exemplified by legal provisions such as prec-
atory regimes and reexame necessário appeal. 
There will be those who think all these clauses are rules. 
There will be those who think all these clauses are princi-
ples. There will be those who think some are rules and 
some are principles. However, what is going to bring guid-
ance and clarity before such a crossroads is legal philoso-
phy.  Everyone views this through their own prism there’s 
no ultimate answer.     
Article 3’s highlights 
Article 3. There are inalienable rights of every person, 
natural or legal, essential for the economic development 
and growth of the country, in accordance to the sole para-
graph of Article 170 of the Constitution:  
Clause I - to perform low-risk economic activity, for 
which exclusive value of private property or consensual 
third parties, without the need for prohibition of public 
execution of economic activities; 
Clause II - to perform economic activity at any time or 
day of including holidays, without any additional charge or 
fee, being observed: (...) 
Clause III - to freely define, in unregulated markets, the 
price of products and services because of changes in supply 
and demand; 
Clause IV - to receive isonomic treatment regarding ex-
ercise of acts of liberation from bodies and entities of the 
public administration, hypothesis in which the act of lib-
eration will be linked to the same criteria of interpretation 
adopted in previous similar administrative decisions, ob-
served the provisions of regulation; 
Clause V - to enjoy presumption of good faith acts per-
formed in the exercise of economic activity, for which the 
doubts of interpretation of the civil, business, economic law 
and urban planning will be solved to preserve autonomy 
private, unless there is a legal provision to the contrary; 
Clause VI - to develop, execute, operate or market new 
modalities products and services when infralegal norms 
become outdated by technological development interna-
tionally consolidated, in accordance with the which shall 
govern the requirements for measuring the situation the 
procedures, the timing and conditions of effects; 
Clause VII - to test and offer, free or not, a new product 
or service for a group of capable people with the use of 
one's own assets or third parties upon authorization of 
these after free and clear consent without requirement or 
public act of release of the economic activity except in fed-
eral law 
Clause VIII - to guarantee that paritarian legal business 
transactions will be under free stipulation of the covenant 
parts, to relegate the application of all business law rules 
only to a subsidiary stance, except rules of public order; 
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 Clause IX - to guarantee that in the requests for public 
acts of liberation of economic activity subject to the provi-
sions of this Law, the information requested should be 
presented as expeditiously as possible once presented all 
the elements necessary for instruction of the process, the 
party will be express and immediately notified from the 
deadline stipulated for the analysis of its request and, after 
the deadline’s expiry, the silence of the competent authori-
ty shall impart tacit approval for all effects, except for the 
hypotheses expressly prohibited by law. 
Clause X - to archive any document through microfilm 
or through any digital means, per the techniques and re-
quirements determined by regulation, which can be made 
to physical document for all legal effects and for any act of 
public law substantiation; 
Clause XI - not to be required any measure, compensa-
tory installment or abusive mitigating action at impact 
studies stage or other economic activity released in urban 
law (...) 
Clause XII - not be required by direct public administra-
tion or indirect certificate without foresight expressed in 
law. 
Commentary on Article Three 
The law’s backbone is Article III, which must be inter-
preted in conjunction with the previous articles, in a sys-
tematic manner.  
Clause I authorizes low-risk economic activities to be in-
itiated without any form of permit of government authori-
zation. It does not include high-risk economic ventures. 
High-risk economic activities will still need a permit.   
Article 3, paragraph I, stipulates that what constitutes 
low-risk activities is determined by the Federal Govern-
ment. If state or municipal administrations rate low-risk 
activities differently than the federal government than their 
ratings will prevail over federal ratings.  
The same paragraph also states that in the absence of 
the Federal Government’s determination on low-risk activi-
ty classification, a resolution enacted by the Committee for 
the Management of the National Web for Simplification of 
Companies and Businesses Register and Regularization 
(CGSIM) is fully applicable. 
The guidelines as to what businesses constitute low-risk 
activities is under Resolution Number 51 of the regulations 
of CGSIM, which started in June of 2019.31 The resolution 
catalogs over 280 business types considered low-risk activi-
ties. Among them are many of the most popular in Brazil: 
clothing stores, different sorts of retail, snack bars, higher 
education, beauty salons, restaurants, and grocery stores 
among others.  
The lawmakers’ intent is to tackle what is known as 
“máfia do alvará”, which could be literally translated as 
“the permit mafia”. In Brazil, and throughout Latin Ameri-
ca as a whole, government officials ask small business own-
ers for kickbacks in order to grant them permits. It repre-
sents a two-tier pressing social menace. Sometimes public 
officials request bribes to issue the permit. On the other 
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hand, not every business should be granted a permit.  Sev-
eral businesses are not qualified to obtain the permit, an 
example of this could be the Kiss nightclub in Santa Maria, 
Rio Grande Do Sul. The Kiss nightclub allegedly received a 
permit without it being in compliance with fire protocols; 
the result was that a fire ravaged the club one evening kill-
ing hundreds of people as there was only one exit, a clear 
violation of the fire safety protocol.   
It is difficult to ascertain how much capital will be saved 
by not having to pay for permits related to low-risk eco-
nomic activities.  This is clearly a financial plus for the Bra-
zilian economy.  The same concept applies to product inno-
vation for low-risk activities, these companies will be 
spared from the time and money wasted on unneeded per-
mits.  By freeing up time and capital to be used to develop 
the business it   will make the businesses more efficient and 
innovative.  This will undoubtedly spur competition and 
economic creativity and give the Brazilian economy a 
much-needed boost, since the country finds itself in a five-
year crisis.   
Clause II aims to assure free enterprise in any given 
time. Clause II, in its three respective sub clauses, prescribe 
certain limits, such as labor law dispositions, environmen-
tal norms and restrictions derived from private legal trans-
actions (under civil law’s Rechtsgeschäft meaning). It is 
important to note that probable clashes will emerge be-
tween this law and local governments, since many cities 
establish their own time constraints on businesses’ activi-
ties.  
Clause III mentions that the government cannot estab-
lish price controls. The particulars of this will be deter-
mined in the near future. There is clearly a direction stipu-
lation towards unregulating prices, as a standard. However, 
given that Article 3 ́s paragraph 3 and respective sub claus-
es have inconspicuous wording, it is somewhat unpredicta-
ble to forecast what will be the exceptions to this rule.  
Brazil has a long history of price control. Vargas’ decree-
law 4.598/42, enacted during his dictatorial period, im-
plemented rent control for two years. In 1964, João Goulart 
passed decree 53.702, freezing rent and establishing prices 
in accordance to the number and nature of the property's 
rooms.  A one room apartment could cost as high as ⅕ of 
the national minimum wage at that time. A studio apart-
ment could be a maximum ⅖.  These erratic price manipu-
lations by President Goulart precipitated a military coup-
d'etat a few days later.   
President Sarney’s Cruzado Plan tried to fix the high in-
flation problem by informally authorizing every Brazilian 
citizen to fiscalize his price control plan implementation. 
Thus, thousands of people voluntarily wore green buttons, 
with the saying Eu sou um fiscal do Sarney (I am an in-
spector for Sarney) and went store to store executing the 
new provision.  The plan did not end well.   
Given Brazilian history and the fact that the Brazilian 
legal system relies heavily on taxation for non-fiscal pur-
poses, there seems to be no way around. On top of that, 
Article III paragraph three also leaves a door open by not 
applying Clause III in “any disposition protected by federal 
law”. In other words, if Congress passes a law setting price 
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control, there is no protection guarantee to private business 
owners. 
Clause IV is fundamental. Government fiscalization is 
binding to public officials. This clause stipulates that there 
is no partiality nor barriers from government entities. 
There can be no double standards. If one provision is ap-
plied to a certain individual, it must be equally extended to 
others. The goal is to enhance legal certainty and generate a 
sense of pre-visibility. This guarantees to the private owner 
that a “fiscal/administrative precedent” must be followed.  
Clause V essentially protects small business owners 
from being unnecessarily penalized for not knowing the 
law. For instance, there are very complex regulations on 
installing roof sheets. If the owner does not proceed cor-
rectly, there will be no fine, unless there is dramatic error 
that could bring dangerous consequences. Clause V also 
frees individuals from having to pay fines due to minor 
mistakes related to not following regulatory code.  The 
individual in error must correct his or her mistake or face a 
fine.   
Clause VI states that the government cannot prevent or 
stop an individual from conducting sound economic activi-
ty based on previous laws or regulations when the industry 
of the business is new.  There must be regulatory frame-
works to have proper governance in place for any new in-
dustry.   
Clause VII determines that the government cannot for-
bid free market forces from acting in the development or 
testing of new products. This provision goes hand in hand 
with Clause I, because they represent the same principle, 
but in different contexts.  
The essential being that if one is not obligated to ask any 
government permit to perform its business’ task, it should 
also not be required any form of authorization regarding 
product or service development. As a parallel, if the prod-
uct development fits into dangerous activity status, in ac-
cordance with the law, then it is necessary to seek a gov-
ernment liberation act. 
Clause VIII utterly enhances freedom of contract among 
same size businesses, being public norms the only re-
strictions thereof. Although the concept beneath covers 
legal transactions between paritarian businesses, there are 
also classic private law systemic restraints.  That is the case 
of Brazilian Civil Code’s Article 104, which invalidates any 
legal transaction settled without minimum requirements 
fulfilment, such as civilly capable person, licit object and 
legally allowed form.  
In Brazil, labor law and consumer protection are pre-
dicted upon the contractor’s inequality position recogni-
tion. Therefore, Clause VIII disposition does not comprise 
freedom of contract in standard form or employment con-
tracts. To some extent, the same applies in America, but 
with certain distinctions.  
American labor law for example relies heavily on judi-
cial evolution. “Freedom to contract” could be envisaged as 
a shorthand expression referring to economic liberty in a 
large and embracing sense, that is, the idea of economic 
individualism.32 Economic liberty in this sense affords free 
play to individuals to use their "faculties,” their natural-
born talents and educated skills, which James Madison and 
other leaders in America's Revolutionary and Founding 
periods declared to be a vital aspect of their "property,'' and 
as such fully as deserving of the state's protection as were 
their chattels, or physical property.33  
For this reason, it is possible to interpret the founding 
Fathers’ perspective on Liberty of Contract as deriving from 
the Lockean system, which is one of freedom of contract 
between individuals, and that the American government is 
based on a contract with the people.34 Being so, the judicial 
understanding until the mid-20th century was consensual, 
by setting the burden of proof on government, not on indi-
viduals. This precedent was followed by Lochner vs. New 
York, Adair vs. United States and Coppage vs. Kansas. It 
was only during the New Deal era, that there was a stark 
shift on Court rulings. 
One can argue, as George M. Stephans does, that: 
“Judges who had received their education or started their 
law practice during the Civil War era espoused freedom of 
contract very strongly, because it was believed that the 
right of the individual to work for whom and how he 
pleased was among the rights for which the Civil War had 
been fought. That war was a violent turn toward Lockean 
rights, made necessary because the human rights of the 
slaves had not been protected by the government. There is 
no freedom of contract in slavery. President Lincoln em-
ployed Jeffersonian thought and the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as the ideological ‘big guns’ in the War”.35 
Brazil though had a different historical path. Brazilian 
labor law was consolidated in Vargas' dictatorial era. It was 
predicted on fascist Benito Mussolini's Carta del Lavoro. 
Worker’s rights were established unilaterally through de-
cree-law by the Executive power nationwide. This 80-
years-old piece of legislation was never voted on by Con-
gress, being solely the object of constitutional reception of 
law. MP 881 did not address the unequal positions in legal 
contracts, such as labor law.  Since Brazil did not have in-
grained Lockean antecedents regarding labor law practices, 
as the United States does, it is hard to grasp a stark differ-
ence in labor relations made by this law.  This difference 
makes it challenging to change labor law relations.  
Clause IX stipulates that the government must meet 
deadlines to provide companies or individuals with re-
sponses as to their filings.  If no response is given from the 
government the business will automatically qualify for its 
filings.   
Again, it seems awkward to the American observer, but 
there is a need for legal enhancement of time control con-
cerning government acts of liberation, or activities in gen-
eral, in Brazil. It is notorious that the Brazilian public ad-
                                                             
32 Harry N. Scheiber. The State and Freedom to Contract. Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1998, pg. 1. 
33 Ibid. 
34 George M. Stephans. Locke, Jefferson, and the Justices: Foun-
dations and Failures of the Us Government. New York: Algora 
Publishing, 2002. pg. 117. 
35 Ibid, 116. 
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ministration is slow-paced. Clause IX creates a legal mech-
anism to put pressure on government performance. Echo-
ing those that highlight the faults in Brazil´s Portuguese 
roots and the sociologists’ analysis on Brazilian bureaucrat-
ic behavior, there will be those who doubt this provision 
could be effective. 
Clause X promulgates that using digital technology to 
regulate official documents regarding all private sector 
activities is now just as valid as paper documents. The gov-
ernment cannot deny digital documents on the grounds of 
not being officially standardized printed.  
Reducing the costs with paper-printed documents is a 
two-way street: it benefits the individual, who is not going 
to be obligated to spend on, and also the government itself, 
which is going to cut unnecessary spending.  This was one 
of Paulo Uebel´s main initiatives as he worked for the city 
of São Paulo; he helped eliminate paper documents in the 
city government. 
Clause XI fixates that any study on the impact of certain 
urban modifications should be considered reasonably as a 
liberation proceedings.  
Finally, Clause XII is also pivotal for the debureaucrati-
zation process implemented by Uebel, under Guedes’s 
guidance. In Brazil, the government normally requires a 
great deal of certificates, many of which are not even men-
tioned in any given law.  Henceforward, this new disposi-
tion ensures that individuals emit certificates only if there 
is a law demanding so. Given the specificities of Brazilian 
bureaucracy, such new practice may be effective, but cer-
tainly it will take time - and a fair amount of litigation.  
Article Four’s highlights 
Article 4. Resolves that it is the duty of the Public Ad-
ministration in all its forms to ensure regulatory compli-
ance related to MP 881, while exercising regulatory compe-
tence concerning this medida provisória, with the excep-
tion of strict legal compliance, preventing abuse of regula-
tory powers (...) 
Commentary on Article 4  
Every time the government in all its forms exercises 
regulatory actions it is under the provision of Article 4. This 
article refers to not only regulatory agencies but to all gov-
ernment bodies when they are exercising regulatory com-
petence.  Regulatory agencies, such as ANVISA (National 
Sanitary Surveillance Agency]), ANAC (National Civil Avia-
tion Agency of Brazil), ANAEL (Brazilian Electricity Regu-
latory Agency), among others in the federal, state or munic-
ipal level. Yet, there have been many instances of malfea-
sance in these regulatory bodies.  
One such instance of abuse in regulatory power is the 
case of the federal agency INMETRO (National Institute of 
Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality), linked 
to MDIC, (Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade). There have been multiple complaints filed against 
this agency. Indeed, one of its presidents suffered a nega-
tive verdict from Rio de Janeiro’s State Court for adminis-
trative irregularities while in charge.36 
Another common objection is related to the slow pace of 
processing. judicial and administrative procedure slowness 
is a theme starkly connected to developing na-
tions ́government practices. In Latin America, it seems to 
be a shared culture, to which sociologists, historians and 
intellectuals have spent precious time on.  
This pace of processing whether it be administrative or 
judicial represents many long-established complaints from 
Brazilian entrepreneurs. Regulatory agencies performance 
is deemed not only unpredictable but also intensely politi-
cized. This indifference by the regulatory agencies concern-
ing bureaucratic processing and competition promotion 
highlights why Brazilian academia and the media have 
recognized a regulatory crisis in Brazil since the mid-
2000s.  
Article 5’ highlights 
Article 5. The editing and amendment proposals of 
normative acts regarding general interest of economic 
agents or users of the services rendered, issued by a federal 
public administration body or entity, including municipali-
ties and public foundations, shall be preceded by regulatory 
impact analysis, which will contain information and data 
on the possible effects of the regulatory act to verify the 
reasonableness of its economic impact. (...) 
Commentary on Article 5 
Article 5 creates the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) 
in Brazil. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) defines the RIA as “a systematic 
approach to critically assessing the positive and negative 
effects of proposed and existing regulations and non-
regulatory alternatives. As employed in OECD countries it 
encompasses a range of methods. It is an important ele-
ment of an evidence-based approach to policy making.”37 
The OECD then adds: “conducting RIA within an ap-
propriate systematic framework can underpin the capacity 
of governments to ensure that regulations are efficient and 
effective in a changing and complex world. Some form of 
RIA has now been adopted by all OECD members, but they 
have all nevertheless found the successful implementation 
of RIA administratively and technically challenging.”38 
Until now the RIA concept was never fully introduced in 
Brazil.  Since at least a decade ago, the OECD has recom-
mended the implementation of the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis as a requirement for the improvement of regula-
tion in Brazil: “Thus, it provides high quality to the end 
product of regulation obeying the policies of government 
with the least possible cost to society.”39 
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Article 5 is one of the few articles which was not altered 
throughout the entire deliberative process. Only the arti-
cle’s number and grammar have been modified. It high-
lights a consensus around Brazil´s intent to become a 
member of the OECD by accepting OECD’s standardiza-
tion. It has been one of the first issues discussed and agreed 
upon by President Trump and President Bolsonaro in their 
talks.40 Inclusion into the OECD has been a top priority of 
the Bolsonaro administration in order to give Brazil a more 
bona-fide boost as a potent global actor. As a result of the 
creation of the RIA the U.S. has officially endorsed Brazil’s 
candidature to be a permanent member of the OECD.41 
One of the main goals of MP 881 is strengthening legal 
certainty. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development devotes special attention to the subject. Legal 
certainty is a central tenet of the rule of law as understood 
around the world.42 RIA is a form of legal certainty that 
was established to further enhance economic freedom.  
Legal certainty may sound unfamiliar to the American 
reader, considering that U.S. common law fundamentally 
differs from civil law.43 American case law is surrounded by 
the “legal indeterminacy” notion, which does not translate 
the exact idea of “legal certainty.”44  
Introduction to chapter V 
14 out of the 20 pages are devoted to the final chapter. It 
starts with article 6 and finishes with article 20, which rep-
resents 38 articles. 70% of this law is located in just the 
final chapter. Chapter V focuses on altering various pieces 
of legislation. There is no systematic approach on combin-
ing these modifications, neither a general line connecting 
all these points. They all must be analyzed in a compart-
mentalized fashion. 
The present study cannot get into all the specifics re-
garding Chapter V. The idea is to present some of the most 
important articles and clauses. 
Most important articles and clauses 
For a medida provisória to become law, it has to be vot-
ed in Congress. The president signs the decree and then it 
is sent to a commission. At this stage, federal deputies es-
tablish their first modifications and the MP is converted 
into a bill to be presented to Congress. The Chamber of 
Deputies (which is equivalent to the American House of 
Representatives) and the Senate have to vote for the bill, 
otherwise the medida provisória expires. After the voting is 
finished and the outcome is favorable the medida provisó-
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ria is fully converted into law. Throughout its whole pro-
cess the law has four different versions, but the one that 
matters is the one out of the Senate. 
As mentioned previously, Chapter V starts with article 6 
and ends with article 20. Article 6 ends the sovereign 
wealth fund (SWF in english; FSB in portuguese). SWF was 
created by president Lula in 2008, during his second term, 
and accumulated BRL 27 billion assets.  The SWF was a 
fund created to be used to cushion impacts from economic 
downturns, as well as aid in internal investments.  Bringing 
SWF to an end was attempted by president Michel Temer’s 
provisional measure 830 in 2018. Down the line, the 
Chamber of Deputies of Brazil rejected the order in De-
cember 2018.45 The Congress’ rejection was minimal in 
nature because the Brazilian SWF holds zero assets since 
the beginning of Temer’s presidency.46 He defunded SWF 
in order to mitigate the national fiscal deficit.  
By accepting Article 6, Congress only recognizes a de 
facto situation. Even though the fund still exists de jure, it 
does not have any money in it. A negative implication is 
that although the fund is liquidated it still exists de jure 
which requires auditing, accountability, administrative 
fees, and all the other costs and time spent concerning ac-
tive account maintenance. Hence this generates irrationally 
needless costs subsidized with tax-payer money.  
Article 16 terminates e-social. It was a reporting obliga-
tion launched by the Brazilian Tax Authorities in order to 
gather labor, social security, and tax information regarding 
employees and independent contractors.47 It was part of 
the Federal Government initiative called SPED (Public 
System for Digital Bookkeeping) that has already changed 
the rules and methodologies of other obligations impacting 
accounting, tax, and financial departments of companies.48 
There seems to be a consensus among entrepreneurs, ac-
countants and tax lawyers that e-social was more prejudi-
cial than beneficial.49 When launched by Dilma’s admin-
istration in 2014, it was supposed to de-bureaucratize data 
compiling, but it turned out to be more complicated than 
before.50 Complaints range from website malfunction to 
trouble on the required data acquisition.51 If the company 
did not correctly follow the confusing instructions and 
complicated deadlines, it would be punished with fees and 
other penalties.52 
On the same grounds, article 15 determines that the 
Brazilian employment record book (CTPS) will preferable 
be issued on a digital version. When a worker loses his or 
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her physical CTPS, countless conundrums may arise. For 
instance, a large deal of gathered data may never be found 
again. Thus, without certain important information, the 
worker cannot receive social security benefits. By losing its 
employee CTPS, the employer can be penalized, in accord-
ance with articles 52 and 53 of Brazilian labor law consoli-
dation (CLT). In some cases, the employer can be con-
demned to compensate for damages.53 Moreover, article 15 
fixes the CPF as the only employee' identification in CTPS. 
As seen, Chapter five is a classic example of a “jumble of 
rules”. There are legal fields involved:  
labor, professional association, sanitary surveillance, 
environmental, notarial, competition, administrative, tax, 
sanitary surveillance law and civil procedure. 
The Chamber of Deputies of Brazil passed a considera-
bly more succinct version of the medida provisória 881 
than the one presented before the house. The current 
speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo Maia, consid-
ered it troublesome implementing too many modifications 
in just one piece of legislation. That is why the medida pro-
visória 881 went from 55 articles to 20 articles in its final 
version. 
In this regard, Maia asserts “We are trying to organize 
something. I tend to curb what is in the scope of the Provi-
sional Measures (...) if I think there are too many things, 
we will clean it up, we are trying in fact to deal with the 
economic freedom issue. If it touches CLT (Consolidation 
of Labor Laws) and other things, which can be good, 
though it is not the best instrument to advance in this mat-
ter”54.  
Maia then winds up “I don’t like that these subjects are 
treated by medida provisória, we don’t gain time, it's not 
faster, and a bill has more flexibility in the Brazilian plena-
ry which is the part of the lower house of congress that is 
devoted to this discussion. In the case of the medida pro-
visória, one can only use the approved text and its present-
ed amendments, whereas in the bill one can go to the ple-
nary and organize the project with a rapporteur.”55 That is 
the reason why MP 881 was drastically consolidated from 
fifty-five articles to twenty.  
Time and time again, Paulo Guedes compares the Bra-
zilian economic situation to a “wounded wale.” In his 
words, reforming pensions and social security is the first 
step towards solving fiscal imbalance and maintaining “the 
patient alive”. Guedes concludes that “Brazil is a wounded 
whale, harpooned many times, and now it's bleeding to 
death. We have to remove all the spears by fixing what is 
                                                             
53 TST - RR: 177005920133170010, Relator: Maurício Godinho 
Delgado, Data de Julgamento: 25/03/2015, 3ª Turma, Data de 
Publicação: DEJT 31/03/2015. 
54 “Estamos tentando organizar alguma coisa. Tendo a limitar o 
que está no escopo da MP", adiantou o presidente. “Acho que 
ficou coisa demais, estamos dando uma limpada, vamos tentar 
tratar de fato de liberdade econômica. Se trata de CLT e de 
outras coisas pode ser até ser bom, mas não é o melhor instru-





wrong.” That explains the government`s urgency to adjust 
federal legislation as soon and as much as possible. 
7. Conclusion 
There are two main perspectives regarding MP 881´s ef-
fectiveness: the skepticals and the optimists. The former 
are composed of people like Marcos Lisboa, Insper presi-
dent (Insper is a globally-ranked business school in São 
Paulo) and Lula’s Minister of Economy. For him, who was 
also connected to the Haddad campaign, MP 881 will not 
be effective, because of its wording.   According to him the 
text is vague and will not be able to produce any real re-
sults. There is criticism regarding MP 881 as redundant 
and obscure, which makes its applicability in court chal-
lenging, bringing more legal uncertainty and increasing 
transaction costs.56 For the critics, MP 881 is not law; it is 
self-help literature for entrepreneurs. 
The latter include a variety of people: from those who 
immediately fell in line with the Bolsonaro administration 
to those who see MP 881, although being problematic 
sometimes, as a much-needed reform. This last group, 
which is slightly optimist, could be considered a third way: 
those who think MP 881 may be effective in some aspects 
but not competent in others.   
Skeptics may be right when they point out MP 881 ́s awk-
ward use of words. They may also be correct when they criticize 
specific provisions regarding final dispositions, such as the ones 
concerning private law alterations. However, something had to 
be done. Brazil cannot be two steps from Venezuelan capitalist 
levels, as it is right now. A developing nation growing at a pace 
of 0% a year is not a sustainable path.57  
The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice held a seminar 
on MP 881 in August, 2019 where various academics, law-
yers, and intellectuals discussed the new law.58 Professor 
Ana Frazão of the University of Brasília, one of the skeptics, 
admitted she was a dissenting  voice  in an ocean of opti-
mism. Her criticism is predicated on the fear of a “hostile 
free-market take-over,” that would “expand inequality” and 
turn the “Amazon into ashes.” 
As State University of Rio de Janeiro Professor Gustavo 
Tepedino said at the event, “MP 881 has itself the merit of 
bringing free-market debate into the Brazilian context.” 
Judicial authorities such as Justice Gilmar Mendes, Justice 
Luis Felipe Salomão, Justice Villas Bôas Cuevas all agreed 
that the legislation is deeply important and positive - which 
may eliminate some doubts regarding MP 881 judicial via-
bility. Justice Mendes even weighed in on MP 881 as being 
timid and not going far enough regarding administrative 
procedure.59 




57 It is not an exaggeration. In Heritage Foundation Liberty Index 
for instance, Brazil is placed at 150, whereas Venezuela is 179. 
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Medida Provisória 881 can be deemed as a ground-
breaking law that has come about at a moment in Brazilian 
history where the country is attempting to make an ex-
traordinary shift to a more open and capitalistic economy.  
This measure creates a more accessible and transparent 
business climate for Brazilians that enables them to freely 
achieve their entrepreneurial pursuits. MP 881 comes at a 
time when the Bolsonaro administration is seriously seek-
ing a means to the end of an economic downturn that has 
encompassed the country since 2014.  
What is remarkable about the law is that it tries to lay a 
solid foundation for individual economic freedom that 
would represent a blunt paradigm shift in Brazilian eco-
nomic thought.  The intent of this cultural shift is to bring 
about increased competition and erstwhile production so 
that the country becomes a potent world economic actor 
and is able to compete and thrive in the global economy.   
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